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Abstract
Formal argumentation is used to enrich and analyse normative multi-agent
systems in various ways. In this chapter, we discuss three examples from the
literature of handling norms by means of formal argumentation. First, we dis-
cuss how existing ways to resolve conflicts among norms using priorities can be
represented in formal argumentation, by showing that the so-called Greedy and
Reduction approaches can be represented using the weakest and the last link
principles respectively. Based on such representation results, formal argumenta-
tion can be used to explain the detachment of obligations and permissions from
hierarchical normative systems in a new way. Second, we discuss how formal
argumentation can be used as a general theory for developing new approaches
for normative reasoning, using a dynamic ASPIC-based legal argumentation
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theory. We show how existing logics of normative systems can be used to anal-
yse such new argumentation systems. Third, we show how argumentation can
be used to reason about other challenges in the area of normative multiagent
systems as well, by discussing a model for arguing about legal interpretation.
In particular, we show how fuzzy logic combined with formal argumentation
can be used to reason about the adoption of graded categories and thus address
the problem of open texture in normative interpretation. Our aim to discuss
these three examples is to inspire new applications of formal argumentation to
the challenges of normative reasoning in multiagent systems.
1 Introduction
Norms regulate our everyday life, and are used to assess conformance of behaviour
with respect to regulations holding in multi-agent systems. Agents undertake dis-
cussions about norms to assess their validity or applicability subject to particular
conditions, to derive the obligations and permissions to be enforced, or to claim
that a certain normative conclusion cannot be derived from the existing regulations.
Given the profound importance of norms in multi-agent systems, it is fundamental
to understand, e.g., which norms are valid in certain environments, how to interpret
them, and to determine the deontic conclusions of such norms. Some influential
philosophers, such as Scott Shapiro [54], argue that the law has an inherent teleo-
logical nature and that norms are plans, and in most existing normative multiagent
systems, norms are like plans which aim at achieving the social goals the members
of a society have decided to share [12, 13]. However, it is not obvious that, for
example, norms stating human rights can be considered as plans, and we therefore
do not commit here to such philosophical claims.
Formal argumentation is typically based on logical arguments constructed from
prioritised rules, and it is no surprise that the first applications of formal argumenta-
tion in the area of normative multiagent systems were concerned with the resolution
of conflicting norms and norm compliance. Moreover, several frameworks have been
proposed for normative and legal argumentation [10], but no comprehensive for-
mal model of normative reasoning from arguments has been proposed yet. In this
chapter we discuss three challenges to illustrate the variety of applications of formal
argumentation techniques in the field of normative multi-agent systems.
• How can formal argumentation be used to explain existing approaches for
reasoning about normative multi-agent systems?
• How can new argumentation systems for reasoning about norms be developed,
and how can these new argumentation systems be analysed?
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• Which issues in the area of normative multiagent systems can be modelled
and analysed using formal argumentation, besides the resolution of conflicting
norms and checking compliance of a system with a set of norms?
First, we discuss how existing detachment procedures for prioritized norms can be
represented in argumentation, by showing how the so-called Greedy and Reduction
approaches can be represented in argumentation by applying the weakest link and
the last link principles respectively [35]. Based on such representation results, formal
argumentation can be used to explain the detachment of obligations and permissions
from hierarchical normative systems in a new way.
Second, we discuss an instance of ASPIC+ [40, 48, 59] capturing the inference
schemes of arguments about norms like legislative and interpretative arguments.
Moreover, we show how to adopt the input/output logic methodology [38] for the
analysis of these new argumentation systems [59].
Third, we discuss the model of da Costa Pereira et al. [17], in which norm inter-
pretation is a mechanism to deal with uncertainty, in contrast to existing models of
norm interpretation in the context of Normative Multi-Agent Systems and AI&Law
[12, 13, 66, 4, 39, 5]. This uncertainty reflects that, in legal theory, a definition of
an empirical concept bounded in all now-foreseeable dimensions can break down in
the face of unforeseen and unforeseeable events, and norms cannot anticipate all
potential occurrences falling within the application scope of any legal norm [29, 37].
In other words, it reflects that the interpretation of legal rules is often uncertain:
legal language is vague, the concepts used to describe a legal rule are not always
precise, and the purpose of the rule may be differently perceived [30, 19, 36]. The
model uses fuzzy logic to measure the uncertainty of legal concepts, and argumen-
tation is used to handle the conflicts between different interpretations of norms.
More precisely, a fuzzy argumentation system [56] to represent the interpretations,
is combined with fuzzy labeling to evaluate the status of fuzzy arguments [18]. As
in many logical analyses of legal reasoning, the model is not purely descriptive and
it is rather meant to offer a rational reconstruction for explaining and checking the
robustness of interpretive arguments. A formal model for legal impreciseness must
be cognitively sound, in the sense that it works on reliable cognitive assumptions.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Second 2 introduces how
prioritized norms can be represented in argumentation. In Section 3, we discuss
the logical properties of the static legal argumentation system proposed by Prakken
and Sartor, and we reformulate it in a normative perspective. Section 4 motivates
our adoption of graded categories as a tool to tackle the problem of open texture
in legal interpretation. Section 5 introduces a model of fuzzy argumentation and
fuzzy labeling, and Section 6 interprets a norm with flexibiity and conducts a case
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study by using an example from medically assisted reproduction. Second 7 discusses
related work and Section 8 concludes.
2 Argumentation semantics for hierarchical normative
systems
Consider the following benchmark example introduced by Hansen [28], which we call
here the prioritised triangle due to its graphical visualization in Figure 1.
Example 1 (Prioritised triangle [28]). Imagine you have been invited to a party. Before the
event, you receive several imperatives, which we consider as the following set of norms.
- Your mother says: if you drink (p), then don’t drive (¬x).
- Your best friend says: if you go to the party (a), then you’ll drive (x) us.
- An acquaintance says: if you go to the party (a), then have a drink with me (p).
We assign numerical priorities to these norms, namely ‘3’, ‘2’ and ‘1’ corresponding to
the sources ‘your mother’, ‘your best friend’ and ‘your acquaintance’, respectively.
Let a, p and x respectively denote the propositions that you go to the party; you drink;
and you drive. In terms of a hierarchical normative systems [1], these norms are respectively
represented as (a, p)1, (p,¬x)3 and (a, x)2. These three norms are visualized in Figure 1(a).
a
p
¬x
1
2
3 A3A2A1A0
[a] [(a,p)] [(a,p),(p,¬x)] [(a,x)]
(a) (b)
Figure 1: The prioritised normative system of the prioritised triangle example.
Consider the following two approaches resulting in different outcomes or exten-
sions [15, 64, 35].
Greedy approach Based on the context, a set of propositions that are known to
hold, this approach always applies the norm with the highest priority that does
not introduce inconsistency to an extension and the context. Here we say that
a norm is applicable when its body is in the context or has been produced
by other norms and added to the extension. In this example, we begin with
the context {a}, and (a, x) is first applied. Then (a, p) is applied. Finally,
(p,¬x) cannot be applied as this would result in a conflict, and so, by using
the Greedy approach, we obtain the extension {p, x}.
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Reduction approach In this approach, a candidate extension is identified. All
norms which are applicable according to this candidate extension are selected
and transformed into unconditional or body-free norms (i.e., a norm (a, b)
selected in this way is transformed to a norm (Û, b)). The modified normative
system, with the transformed norms is evaluated using the Greedy approach.
The candidate extension is selected as an extension by the Reduction approach
if it is identified as an extension according to this application of the Greedy
approach. In this example, selecting a candidate extension {p,¬x}, we get
a set of body-free norms {(Û, p), (Û,¬x), (Û, x)}. The priorities assigned to
these norms are carried through from the original normative system, and are
therefore respectively 1, 3 and 2. After applying the Greedy approach, we get
{p,¬x}, which is thus an extension of the Reduction approach. If on the other
hand we had selected the candidate extension {p, x}, this new extension would
not appear in the greedy evaluation, because (Û, x) has a lower priority than
(Û,¬x). Consequently {p, x} is not an extension of the Reduction approach.
We now consider the prioritised triangle example in formal argumentation. Given
a normative system, we may construct an argumentation framework as illustrated
in Figure 1(b), which is a directed graph in which nodes denote arguments, and
edges denote attacks between arguments. An argument is represented as a path of
a directed graph starting from a node in the context. In this simple example, there
are four arguments A0, A1, A2 and A3, represented as [a], [a, p], [a, p,¬x] and [a, x],
respectively. Since the conclusions of A2 and A3 are inconsistent, A2 attacks A3 and
vice versa. Priorities allow us to transform these attacks into defeats according to
different principles.
Last link ranks an argument based on the strength of its last inference, if the last
link principle is applied, then [a, p,¬x] defeats [a, x]. As result, the principle
allows us to conclude {p,¬x}.
Weakest link ranks an argument based on the strength of its weakest inference. If
the weakest link principle is used instead, [a, x] defeats [a, p,¬x], and concludes
{p, x}.
In this example, the last link principle thus gives the same result as the Reduction
approach, and weakest link gives the same result as the Greedy approach. Liao
et al. [35] show that this is not a coincidence, but it holds for all totally ordered
normative systems. This result addresses the challenge raised by Dung [20] aiming
at representing nonmonotonic logics through formal argumentation. In particular,
argumentation is a way to exchange and communicate viewpoints, thus having an
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argumentation theory representing a nonmonotonic logic is desirable for such a logic,
in particular when the argumentation theory is simple and efficient. Note that it
is not helpful for the development of nonmonotonic logics themselves, but it helps
when we want to apply such logics in distributed and multiagent scenarios.
Based on such representation results, formal argumentation can be used to ex-
plain the detachment of obligations and permissions from hierarchical normative
systems in a new way. Moreover, many other challenges in normative reasoning have
been expressed as inconsistent sets of formulas that are intuitively consistent, tradi-
tionally called deontic paradoxes. The most well known are the so-called contrary-
to-duty paradoxes, which are concerned with handling norm violations. Techniques
from non-monotonic reasoning have been applied to handle contrary-to-duty rea-
soning, and formal argumentation techniques can be applied in the same way [44].
Finally, the most discussed practical problem in normative systems is norm con-
formance and compliance, which is a computational problem to check whether a
business process is in accordance with a set of norms. Handling priorities among
norms is again a central challenge for norm compliance, and formal argumentation
techniques for resolving conflicts between norms can be extended with reasoning
about business processes to reason about norm compliance [57].
3 New argumentation systems for normative reasoning
In the previous section, we used an argumentation system to explain the conclusions
that are detached from a hierarchical normative system. The converse is done as
well: new argumentation systems for normative reasoning have been developed for
normative reasoning, for which detachment procedures have been defined to analyse
these argumentation systems. We illustrate this by the argumentation system for
legal reasoning proposed by Prakken and Sartor [48], which has been analyzed and
extended by van der Torre and Villata [59].
Definition 1 (LAS-PS). A legal argumentation system or LAS is a tuple 〈L,−,R〉
where L is the legal language of all sentences α, − : L → 2L is a function given by
−(P ) = {¬P}, −(¬P ) = {P} and −(N) = ∅, and R contains the Defeasible modus
ponens (DMP ), rule for each possible norm N of the form φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn  ψ.
DMP: φ1, . . . , φn, φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn  ψ ⇒ ψ;
In order to illustrate the legal argumentation framework, the running example
proposed by Prakken and Sartor [48] is adapted.
Example 2 (Smoking regulations). Consider propositional atoms P ::= a|b|c|d|e|f
where a: “people want to smoke in a closed space”, b: “the public place has special
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secluded smoking areas”, c: “people need to smoke cannabis on medical grounds”,
d: “people are forbidden from smoking cannabis and tobacco in public places”, e:
“cannabis is allowed for medical treatment”, f : “people are permitted to smoke
cannabis in recreational cannabis establishments”. R contains expressions for infer-
ence rules DMP of the form, for example: a, a b⇒ b and a,¬c, a ∧ ¬c d⇒ d.
Prakken and Sartor [48] follow Modgil and Prakken [40], and do not consider a
model theoretic semantics for this language. Instead, they define a set of arguments.
Definition 2 (LAS PS arguments). A knowledge base K is a set of sentences of L.
The set of arguments A on the basis of a knowledge base K in a legal argumentation
system LAS is called Arg(LAS,K) and is the smallest set of expressions containing
the literals in K and closed under the following rule:
if A1, . . . , An ⊆ Arg(LAS,K) and concl(A1), . . . , concl(An) ⇒ L ∈ R then we
have also (A1, . . . , An ⇒ L) ∈ Arg(LAS,K),
where concl(A) is defined by concl(L) = L and concl(A1, . . . , An ⇒ L) = L. We
may leave out the brackets if there is no risk of confusion.
To study this notion of norm based argument, consequence is defined by con-
sidering only the conclusions of the arguments, in other words, by abstracting away
the explicit arguments. Following input/output logic conventions, the consequence
is called Out.
Definition 3 (Output PS). Out(LAS,K) = {concl(A) | A ∈ Arg(LAS,K)}.
Example 3 (Continued). Consider the knowledge base of the smoking regulations
K1 = {a, b, c, e, a ∧ b ¬d, c ∧ ¬d ∧ e f} where the norms state that
• if people want to smoke in a closed space and the public place has smoking
special secluded areas, then people are not forbidden from smoking cannabis
and tobacco in public places;
• if people need to smoke cannabis on medical grounds and it is not forbidden
from smoking cannabis and tobacco in public places and cannabis is allowed for
medical treatment, then people are permitted to smoke cannabis in recreational
cannabis establishments;
Arguments can be constructed combining DMP inference rules as follows:
• A1 : a, b, a ∧ b ¬d⇒ ¬d;
• A2 : c, (a, b, a ∧ b ¬d⇒ ¬d), e, c ∧ ¬d ∧ e f ⇒ f .
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Therefore, from arguments A1, A2, we have that concl(A1) = ¬d and concl(A2) = f .
We conclude that Out(LAS1,K1) = {a, b, c,¬d, e, f}.
We now introduce a logical analysis. Van der Torre and Villata [59] use a proof
system with expressions K ∴ L. The proof system contains four rules, called Iden-
tity (ID), Strengthening of the input (SI), Factual Detachment (FD), and Deontic
Detachment (DD). The former is sometimes called Monotonicity (Mon), and the lat-
ter two are sometimes called Modus Ponens (MP) or Cumulative Transitivity (CT).
The notion of consequence is called simple-minded reusable throughput or out+3 by
Makinson and van der Torre [38].
Definition 4 (Derivations PS). der(LAS) is the smallest set of expressions K ∴ L
closed under the following four rules.
ID: {L} ∴ L for a literal L
SI: from K ∴ L derive K ∪K ′ ∴ L
FD: {L1, . . . , Ln, L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ln  L} ∴ L for a norm L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ln  L
DD: from K ∴ Li for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and K ∪ {L1 . . . , Ln} ∴ L derive K ∴ L
The close relation between arguments and derivations in a deontic logic or a logic
of normative systems is illustrated by the following property:
K ∴ L ∈ der(LAS) iff L ∈ Out(LAS,K).
This is not surprising, as the similarity is quite clear from the structure of argu-
ments. However, making the relation precise by framing the legal argument system
into an input/output logic highlights a drawback of the legal argumentation system
of Prakken and Sartor: simple-minded reusable throughput is usually adopted for
default logics and logic programs, not for the normative reasoning.
To establish the results with constrained input/output logic, only rebut is con-
sidered. Thus undercut is not considered. Moreover, they do not consider defeasible
knowledge and undermining. So the only attack is the attack of an argument with
an opposite literal. This is obviously a very simple notion of attack which is of
little use in most applications, but it useful to establish the relation with logical
approaches.
Definition 5 (Attack PS). The set of sub-arguments of B is the smallest set con-
taining B, and closed under the rule: if A1, . . . , An ⇒ L is a sub-argument of B,
then A1, . . . , An are also sub-arguments of B.
A attacks B iff there is a sub-argument B′ of B such that
concl(A) ∈ −(concl(B′)). We write attack(AS,K) for the set of all attacks among
Arg(AS,K).
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A semantics associates sets of extensions with an argumentation framework,
where each extension consists of a set of arguments. For each extension, the output
consists of the set of conclusions of the arguments, as for Out before. A semantics
thus gives us a set of sets of conclusions, which is called an Outfamily.
Definition 6 (Outfamily PS). An extension is a set of arguments, and an argu-
mentation semantics sem(arg, attack) is a function that takes as input a set of
arguments and a binary attack relation among the arguments, and as output a set
of extensions.
Outfamily(K, sem) = {{concl(A) | A ∈ S} | S ∈ sem(arg(AS,K), attack(AS,K))}.
Constrained output in the input/output logic framework is defined as follows,
being inspired by maximal consistent set constructions in belief revision and non-
monotonic reasoning. Maxf takes the maximal sets of norms of K such that the
output of K is consistent, and Outf takes the output of these maximal norm sets.
Definition 7 (Outf). Let K = KL ∪KN consist of literals KL and norms KN .
Conf(K) = {N ⊆ KN | Out(KL ∪N) consistent}
Maxf(K) = {N ⊆ KN | N maximal w.r.t ⊆ in Conf(K)}
Outf(K) = {Out(KL ∪N) | N ∈ Maxf(K)}
Theorem 1 (Characterization PS). Outfamily(KB, sem) = Outf (K) for sem is
stable or preferred.
Van der Torre and Villata [59] add an additional modal operator O to the lan-
guage. All norms are of the form L1∧ . . .∧Ln  L, as before, or L1∧ . . .∧Ln  OL.
The body contains simple literals and the head contains either a literal or an obli-
gation. They redefine the concepts or LAS, Out, der, etc. As there is no risk for
confusion, we refer to them with the same names as in the previous sections.
Definition 8 (LAS O). Given a set of propositional atoms. The literals, norms and
legal language Lare given by the following BNF.
L ::= P | ¬P with P in propositional atoms
M ::= L | OL
N ::= L ∧ . . . ∧ L M
α ::= L | N
A legal argumentation system with obligations or LAS is as defined before, where the
− function is extended to obligations.
The definition of arguments is adapted in the obvious way. In the output, they
consider only the obligatory propositions.
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Definition 9 (Output O). Out(LAS,K) = {L | A ∈ Arg(LAS,K), concl(A) =
OL}.
Example 4. We consider a revised version of the running example about smoking
regulations. We have that the LAS2 is based on propositional atoms P ::= a|b|c|d|e
where a: “the person wants to smoke in a closed space”, b: “the person is in a
private space”, c: “the person needs to smoke on medical grounds”, d: “the person is
forbidden from smoking”, e: “use electronic cigarettes”. and Rcontains expressions
for inference rules of the form:
• a, a b⇒ b;
• a,¬c, a ∧ ¬c d⇒ Od;
Consider now the extended knowledge base of the smoking regulations represented
by K2 = {a,¬b,¬c, a ∧ ¬c  d, a ∧ b  ¬d, c  ¬d, a ∧ d  Oe} where the norms
state that
• if the person is in a closed space and she does not need to smoke on medical
grounds, then the person is forbidden from smoking;
• if the person wants to smoke in a closed space and she is in a private space,
then the person is not forbidden from smoking;
• if the person needs to smoke on medical grounds, then she is not forbidden
from smoking;
• if the person wants to smoke in a closed space and she is forbidden from smok-
ing, then it is obligatory to use electronic cigarettes;
We can construct the following arguments:
• A1 : a,¬c, a ∧ ¬c d⇒ d;
• A2 : a, (a,¬c, a ∧ ¬c d⇒ d), a ∧ d Oe⇒ Oe;
We have that concl(A1) = {d} and concl(A2) = {Oe}, and we can thus con-
clude Out(LAS2,K2) = {e} i.e., the conclusion is an obligation to use electronic
cigarettes.
The constrained version can be defined analogously.
The proof system contains two rules, Strengthening of the Input (SI) and Factual
Detachment (FD). The notion of consequence is called simple-minded output or out1
by Makinson and van der Torre [38].
3048
Handling Norms in MAS by Means of Formal Argumentation
Definition 10 (Derivations O). der(LAS) is the smallest set of expressions K ∴ L
closed under the following two rules.
SI: from K ∴ L derive K ∪K ′ ∴ L
FD: {L1, . . . , Ln, L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ln  L} ∴ L for a norm L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ln  OL
Again we have K ∴ L ∈ der(LAS) iff L ∈ Out(LAS,K). The system does not
satisfy deontic detachment, e.g. from K = {a, a  Ob, b  Oc} we cannot derive
Oc. This is reflected in the proof system by the lack of the DD rule.
Finally, van der Torre and Villata show how can to redefine the concepts of LAS,
Out, der, etc., to re-introducing deontic detachment. This illustrates how the formal
analysis can inspire the development of new argumentation systems.
4 From Open Texture to Graded Categories
4.1 Flexible legal interpretation based on graded categories
Legal systems are the product of human mind and are written in natural language.
This implies that the basic processes of human cognition have to be taken into
account when interpreting norms, and that, as natural languages are inherently
vague and imprecise, so are norms.
The application of laws to a new situation is a metaphorical process: the new
situation is mapped on to a situation in which applying law is obvious, by analogy.
Here, by metaphor we mean using a well understood, prototypical situation to rep-
resent and reason about a less understood, novel situation. Metaphors are one of
the basic building blocks of human cognition [34].
Norms are written with references to categories. As pointed out by Lakoff [33],
“Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. There is nothing more basic
than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech.” The “classical
theory” that categories are defined by common properties is not entirely wrong, but
it is only a small part of the story. It is now clear that categories may be based
on prototypes. Some categories are vague or imprecise; some do not have gradation
of membership, while others do. The category “US Senator” is well defined, but
categories like “rich person” or “tall man” are graded, simply because there are
different degrees of richness and tallness. However, it is important to notice that
these degrees of membership depend both on the the context in which the norm will
be applied and on the goal associated to the norm. To be considered tall in the
Netherlands is not the same as to be considered tall in Portugal, for example. We
have thus first to consider the context and then the goal associated to the norm.
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We explore the use of fuzzy logic as a suitable technical tool to capture the
imprecision related to categories. More precisely, a category may be represented as
a fuzzy set: the membership of an element to a category is a graded notion.
As a result, we get that a norm may apply to a given situation only to a certain
extent and different norms may apply to different extents to the same situation.
4.1.1 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic was initiated by Lotfi Zadeh [65] with his seminal work on fuzzy sets.
Fuzzy set theory provides a mathematical framework for representing and treating
vagueness, imprecision, lack of information, and partial truth. Fuzzy logic is based
on the notion of fuzzy set, a generalization of classical sets obtained by replacing the
characteristic function of a set A, χA which takes up values in {0, 1}, i.e. χA(x) = 1
iff x ∈ A, χA(x) = 0 otherwise, with a membership function µA, which can take
up any value in [0, 1]. The value µA(x) is the membership degree of element x in
A, i.e., the degree to which x belongs in A. A fuzzy set is completely defined by
its membership function. In fact, we can say that a fuzzy set is its membership
function.
Operation on Fuzzy Sets The usual set-theoretic operations of union, intersec-
tion, and complement can be defined as a generalization of their counterparts on
classical sets by introducing two families of operators, called triangular norms and
triangular co-norms [52, 53, 42]. A triangular norm (or t-norm) is a binary operation
T : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfying the following conditions for x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]:
• T (x, y) = T (y, x) (commutativity);
• T (x, T (y, z)) = T (T (x, y), z) (associativity):
• y ≤ z ⇒ T (x, y) ≤ T (x, z) (monotonicity);
• T (x, 1) = x (neutral element 1).
A well-known property about t-norms is:
T (x, y) ≤ min(x, y). (1)
A triangular conorm (or t-conorm or s-norm), dual to a triangular norm, is a
binary operation S : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1], whose neutral element is 0 instead of 1,
with all other conditions identical to those of a t-norm:
• S(x, y) = S(y, x) (commutativity);
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• S(x, S(y, z)) = S(S(x, y), z) (associativity):
• y ≤ z ⇒ S(x, y) ≤ S(x, z) (monotonicity);
• S(x, 0) = x (neutral element 0).
A well-known property about t-conorms is:
S(x, y) ≥ max(x, y). (2)
If T is a t-norm, then S(x, y) ≡ 1− T (1− x, 1− y) is a t-conorm and vice versa:
T and S in this case form a dual pair of a t-norm and a t-conorm. Noteworthy
examples of such dual pairs are:
• TM (x, y) = min{x, y}, SM (x, y) = max{x, y} (minimum t-norm and maximum
t-conorm or Gödel t-norm and t-conorm);
• TP (x, y) = xy, SP (x, y) = x+ y − xy (product t-norm and t-conorm or prob-
abilistic product and sum);
• TL(x, y) = max{x + y − 1, 0}, SL(x, y) = min{x + y, 1} (Lukasiewicz t-norm
and t-conorm or bounded sum);
For a given choice of a dual pair of a t-norm and a t-conorm (T, S), given
two fuzzy sets A and B and an element x, the set-theoretic operations of union,
intersection, and complement are thus defined as follows:
µA∪B(x) = S(µA(x), µB(x)); (3)
µA∩B(x) = T (µA(x), µB(x)); (4)
µA¯(x) = 1− µA(x). (5)
4.2 Representing Norms
A norm r may be represented as a rule b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l such that l is the legal effect
of r, such as an obligation linked to the norm [50]. A norm then has a conditional
structure such as b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l (if b1, . . . , bn hold, then l ought to be the case). An
agent is compliant with respect to this norm if l is obtained whenever b1, . . . , bn is
derived. Often, logical models of legal reasoning assume that conditions of norms
give a complete description of their applicability [50].
However, this assumption is too strong, due to the complexity and dynamics of
the world. Norms cannot take into account all the possible conditions where they
should or should not be applied, giving rise to the so called “penumbra”: a core of
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cases which can clearly be classified as belonging to the concept. By a penumbra of
hard cases, membership of the concept can be disputed. Moreover, not only does the
world change as also pointed out in [36], giving rise to circumstances unexpected
to the legislator who introduced the norm, but even the ontology of reality can
change with respect to the one constructed by the law to describe the applicability
conditions of norms. See, e.g., the problems concerning the application of existing
laws to privacy, intellectual property or technological innovations in healthcare. To
cope with unforeseen circumstances, the judicial system, at the moment in which a
case concerning a violation is discussed in court, is empowered to interpret, i.e., to
change norms, under some restrictions not to go beyond the purpose from which the
norms stem.
The clauses of a norm often refer to imprecise concepts, which can take up dif-
ferent meanings depending on the purpose of the norm. The case for using fuzzy
categories to account for such imprecise concepts has been made by da Costa Pereira
et al. [17]: those imprecise concepts are a product of the human mind and, more
precisely, of a categorization process. According to prototype theory, which is one
of the most prominent and influential accounts of the cognitive processes of catego-
rization, each category is defined by one or more prototypes [60], which are typical
exemplars of it. A prototype may be regarded as being represented by a property
list which has salient properties of the objects that are classified into the concept.
We may formalize these notions in a way that is compatible with an underlying
knowledge representation standard and technical infrastructure like the ones pro-
vided by the W3C for the Semantic Web, i.e. OWL based on description logics
for the terminological part and RDF for the assertional part. This would allow a
practical implementation of our proposal using state-of-the-art knowledge engineer-
ing technologies. Nevertheless, we keep our formalization abstract for the sake of
clarity.
Definition 11 (Language). Given a knowledge base K, an atom is a unary or binary
predicate of the form C(s), R(s1, s2), where the predicate symbol C is a concept name
in K and R is a role name in K, s, s1, s2 are terms. A term is either a variable
(denoted by x, y, z) or a constant (denoted by a, b, c) standing for an individual name
or data value.
According to this formalisation, an individual object o is described by all the
facts of the form C(o), R(o, y) and R(y, o) such that K |= C(o), K |= R(o, y) and
K |= R(y, o), where |= stands for entailment. We call these facts the properties of o.
Definition 12 (Graded Category). A graded category C˜ is described by a non-
empty set of prototypes Prot(C˜) = {o1, o2, . . . , on}, where each oi ∈ Prot(C˜) is an
individual name in K.
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We can consider that the choice of the actual (more plausible) category with re-
spect to a prototype may be seen as if the prototype represented a kind of generalisa-
tion, which applied deductively, will allow to “classify” (categorise) new “problems”
(instances) [7].
The membership of an instance to a category depends on its similarity to its
prototype(s). Using a similarity measure with values in [0, 1] allows us to represent
graded categories as fuzzy sets. A similarity measure of that kind may be defined.
Here, we adapt the contrast model of similarity proposed by Tversky [58]. In such
a model, an object is represented by means of a set of features and the similarity
between two objects is defined as an increasing function of the features in common
to the two objects, common features, and as a decreasing function of the features
that are present in one object but not in the other, distinctive features.
Definition 13 (Number of Common Features). Given two objects or individuals
a, b in K, the number of their common features c(a, b) is defined as
c(a, b) = ‖{C : K |= C(a) ∧ C(b)}‖
+ ‖{〈R, c〉 : K |= R(a, c) ∧R(b, c)}‖
+ ‖{〈c,R〉 : K |= R(c, a) ∧R(c, b)}‖,
where ∧ represents the and logical connective.
Definition 14 (Number of Distinctive Features). Given two objects or individuals
a, b in K, the number of their distinctive features dis(a, b) is defined as
dis(a, b) = ‖{C : K |= C(a)⊕ C(b)}‖
+ ‖{〈R, c〉 : K |= R(a, c)⊕R(b, c)}‖
+ ‖{〈c,R〉 : K |= R(c, a)⊕R(c, b)}‖,
where ⊕ represents the exclusive or logical connective.
It might be the case, in a given application, that some features are more impor-
tant than others. This might be taken into account by defining different weights for
each feature, depending on the application. Let w : Predicates → R+ be a func-
tion associating a weight to each concept and role name in the language. The two
functions c and dis might then be redefined as follows:
c(a, b) = ∑C:K|=C(a)∧C(b)w(C)
+ ∑R w(R) · ‖{c : K |= R(a, c) ∧R(b, c)}‖
+ ∑R w(R) · ‖{c : K |= R(c, a) ∧R(c, b)}‖;
dis(a, b) = ∑C:K|=C(a)⊕C(b)w(C)
+ ∑R w(R) · ‖{c : K |= R(a, c)⊕R(b, c)}‖
+ ∑R w(R) · ‖{c, : K |= R(c, a)⊕R(c, b)}‖.
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These boil down to Definitions 13 and 14 when w(C) = 1 for all C and w(R) = 1
for all R.
Definition 15 (Object Similarity). Given two objects or individuals a, b in K, their
similarity is defined as
s(a, b) = c(a, b)c(a, b) + dis(a, b) .
This similarity function satisfies a number of desirable properties. For all indi-
viduals a, b,
• 0 ≤ s(a, b) ≤ 1;
• s(a, b) = 1 if and only if a = b;
• s(a, b) = s(b, a);
We may now define the notion of membership degree of an object o in a graded
category.
Definition 16. Given a graded category C˜ and an arbitrary individual name o, the
degree of membership of o in C˜ is given by
µC˜(o) = S
p∈Prot(C˜)
s(o, p).
Since the category of an item in the left-hand-side of a rule may be vague or
imprecise, the degrees of truth of such an item with respect to the actual situation
may be partial. This implies that a rule can be partially activated, i.e., the state of
affairs to be reached thanks to the compliance to that rule can be uncertain.
Let us consider the following rule r: b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l, where the clauses bi have
the form “oi is C˜i” and let C˜1, . . . , C˜n be the categories of b1, . . . , bn, respectively. A
clause bi of a norm involving a graded category may thus be true only to a degree.
The premise of the norm may be partially true and a norm may thus apply only to
some extent.
If the membership of an instance in a category depends on its similarity to
the prototype of the category and also on the purpose of the norm, then we must
conclude that both the prototype of a category and the similarity measure used to
compute the membership might vary as a function of the purpose. While it may be
hard to see how the similarity measure could change as a function of purpose, it is
reasonable to assume that the legislators may have different prototypes in mind for
a category with the same name when they write norms for different purposes.
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This amounts to assuming that, given a graded category C˜, its set of prototypes
may vary as a function of the purpose or goal G of the norm. We write Prot(C˜ | G)
to denote the set of the prototypes of category C˜ when the purpose of a norm is G.
The degree of truth αiG of clause bi = “oi is C˜i”, given that the purpose of the
norm is G, may be computed as
αiG = µC˜i(oi | G) = S
p∈Prot(C˜|G)
s(oi, p). (6)
Definition 17. The degree to which the premise b1, . . . , bn of rule of the form
b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l is satisfied, given that the purpose of r is G, is given by
Deg(b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l | G) = T
i=1,...,n
αiG.
The state of affairs which is reached thanks to the compliance of r will be asso-
ciated with the truth degree of Deg(r | G) — this is also the degree associated to l
after the activation of r.
5 Fuzzy Argumentation and Fuzzy Labeling
In recent years, several research efforts have attempted to combine formal argu-
mentation and fuzzy logic, in such a way that the uncertainty of arguments can
be measured by their fuzzy degrees, while the conflicts between arguments can be
properly handled by Dung’s argumentation semantics. Among them, Tamani and
Croitoru [56] proposed a quantitative preference based argumentation system, called
F-ASPIC. Based on ASPIC and fuzzy set theory, it can be used to model structured
argumentation with fuzzy concepts. However, it is not clear how the status of a
fuzzy argument is evaluated. Meanwhile, da Costa Perira et al. [18] introduce a
labeling-based approach to evaluate the status of fuzzy arguments. Therefore, these
two approaches are combined to lay a foundation for legal interpretation.
5.1 Fuzzy Argumentation System
A fuzzy argumentation system based on Tamani and Croitoru’s F-ASPIC is pro-
posed, with some adaptations to make it fit our framework, and with the addition
of the fuzzy labeling algorithm proposed by [18].
The main differences between our framework and F-ASPIC [56] are as follows.
In our framework, we do not need to represent rules with different degrees of
importance, as Tamani and Croitoru do. Unlike in F-ASPIC, the antecedent of a
rule may be partially satisfied, if it involves graded categories. As a consequence, the
3055
da Costa Pereira et al.
consequent of that rule will have a partial truth degree and an argument depending
on that rule has a partial membership in the set A of “active” arguments in the
senese of da Costa Pereira et al.. So, although from a semantical point of view these
gradual notions of partial truth or satisfaction are quite different from Tamani and
Croitoru’s notion of importance and strength, they lead to a mathematical treatment
which is formally identical. Our main adaptation of F-ASPIC is therefore to replace,
in the wording and in the formalism, these notions.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that every element of the language and every
rule are fallible. Hence, we do not differentiate between strict rules and defeasible
rules, as ASPIC+ does, but we assume that we only have defeasible rules. This
assumption makes the rationality postulates [2] trivially satisfied. However, it does
not make things technically simpler (partial truth is basically preserved via strict
rules, since they encode indisputable inferences). As a matter of fact, since strict
rules satisfy contraposition (i.e., P ⇒ Q is equivalent to ¬Q⇒ ¬P ), while defeasible
rules do not have to, such behavior, when required, has to be explicitly simulated.
Definition 18 (Fuzzy argumentation system). A fuzzy argumentation system, de-
noted as FAS, is a tuple (L, cf,R, n,Deg) where
• L is a logical language.
• cf is a contrariness function (in this chapter, we only consider the classical
negation ¬),
• R is the set of (defeasible) inference rules of the form φ1, . . . , φm ⇒ φ (where
φi, φ ∈ L) .
• n : R Ô→ L is a naming convention for rules.
• Deg : R → [0, 1] is a function returning the degree of activation of a rule, given
a grounding of the formulas occurring in it. Intuitively, Deg(r) represents the
degree of truth of the antecedent of r.
In the original F-ASPIC system, fuzzy arguments are then constructed with
respect to a fuzzy knowledge base K, assigning a degree of importance µK(p) to
each proposition p ∈ L. In our framework, however, we do not attach a degree of
importance to propositions of formulas per se, but we need to evaluate a degree of
truth of their grounding with respect to graded categories. To be more precise, the
atomic propositions that are liable to have a partial degree of truth are those of the
form “x is C”, where C is a graded category. Given a substitution of variable x with
an individual object o, the truth value of the grounding “o is C” will be given, as
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suggested in the previous section, by the similarity measure s(o, p) of o to one of the
prototypes p of C (i.e., one p in the set Prot(C)). To this aim, we keep the same
symbol K, but we regard it as a fuzzy valuation function.
Definition 19 (Fuzzy Valuation Function). A fuzzy valuation function in a FAS =
(L, cf,R, n,Deg) is a fuzzy set K : Lground → [0, 1] such that:
• if φ ∈ Lground is a ground atomic proposition of the form “o is C”, with C a
graded category,
K(o is C) = S
p∈Prot(C)
s(o, p); (7)
• if φ ∈ Lground is a ground atomic proposition not involving graded categories,
K(φ) ∈ {0, 1};
• if φ, ψ ∈ Lground,
K(¬φ) = 1−K(φ),
K(φ ∧ ψ) = T (K(φ),K(ψ))
K(φ ∨ ψ) = S(K(φ),K(ψ))
where T represents a triangular norm and S an associated triangular co-norm.
Let r : b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l be a rule. In a very simple case, the degree of activation
Deg of r simply corresponds to the value returned by the Fuzzy Valuation Function
K(∧1≤k≤n bk).
Definition 20 (Fuzzy argument). A fuzzy argument A on the basis of an argu-
mentation theory with fuzzy valuation function K and a fuzzy argumentation system
is
• φ if φ ∈ L with: Prem(A) = {φ}, Conc(A) = φ, Sub(A) = {A}, Rules(A) =
∅.
• A1, . . . , Am ⇒ φ if A1, . . . , Am are arguments such that there exists a rule
Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(Am)⇒ ψ in R. In this case, Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪
· · · ∪ Prem(Am), Conc(A) = ψ, Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sub(Am) ∪ {A},
Rules(A) = Rules(A1)∪ · · ·∪Rules(Am)∪{Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(Am)⇒ ψ}.
Given an argument A, Conc(A) denotes the conclusion of A, Prem(A) the set
of the premises of A, Sub(A) the set of the sub-arguments of A (including A itself),
and Rules(A) the set of rules involved in A.
3057
da Costa Pereira et al.
Then, the degree of activation of each argument is measured by a fuzzy degree,
called strength of argument in F-ASPIC, which can also be interpreted as a degree
of membership in the set of active arguments, defined as follows.
Definition 21 (Strength of argument). Given a fuzzy argument A, its strength,
denoted A(A), is defined as follows:
• if A is of the form φ, then A(A) = K(φ);
• otherwise,
A(A) = S
r∈Rules(A)
T
(
Deg(r), T
φ∈Prem(A)
K(φ)
)
. (8)
Then, with respect to the notions of rebut, undercut and defeat in ASPIC, the
counterparts in the setting of fuzzy argumentation are defined as follows.
Unlike F-ASPIC, our framework does not require the definition of a fuzzy coun-
terpart of the rebut, undercut, and defeat relation. We rely on the usual crisp
relations, defined as follows.
Definition 22 (Attacks). A attacks B iff A undercuts, rebuts or undermines B,
where the function n is a naming convention for rules, which maps each rule to a
well-formed formula in L [41], and
• A undercuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = ¬n(r) for some B′ ∈ Sub(B).
• A rebuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = ¬φ for some ∃B′ ∈ Sub(B) of the form
B′′1 , . . . , B′′m ⇒ φ.
• A undermines B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = ¬φ for some B′ = φ, φ ∈ Prem(B).
Definition 23 (Defeat). A defeats B iff A undercuts B on B′, or A rebuts (under-
mines) B on B′ and A(A) ≮ A(B′).
We use A and D to denote, respectively, the fuzzy set of active arguments (whose
membership is their strength) and the defeat relation between them. Then, a fuzzy
argumentation framework is represented as F = (A,D).
This fuzzification of A provides a natural way of associating strengths to argu-
ments, and suggests rethinking the labeling of an argumentation framework in terms
of fuzzy degrees of argument acceptability [18]. The status of arguments can thus
be evaluated by means of Fuzzy AF-labeling.
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Definition 24 (Fuzzy AF-labeling). Let (A,D) be a fuzzy argumentation frame-
work. A fuzzy AF-labeling is a total function α: A Ô→ [0, 1].
Definition 25 (Fuzzy Reinstatement labeling). Let (A,D) be a fuzzy argumentation
framework, and α be a fuzzy AF-labeling. We say that α is a fuzzy reinstatement
labeling iff, for all argument A,
α(A) = min{A(A), 1−maxB:(B,A)∈Dα(B)} (9)
Da Costa Periera et al. [18] made clear that given a fuzzy argumentation frame-
work, its fuzzy reinstatement labeling may be computed by solving a system of n
non-linear equations, where n = ‖supp(A)‖, i.e., the number of arguments belonging
to some non-zero degree in the fuzzy argumentation framework, of the same form as
Equation 9, in n unknown variables, namely, the labels α(A) for all A ∈ supp(A).
This can be done quite efficiently using an iterative method as follows: we start
with an all-in labeling (a labeling in which every argument is labeled with the degree
it belongs to A). We denote by α0 = A this initial labeling, and by αt the labeling
obtained after the tth iteration of the labeling algorithm.
Definition 26. Let αt be a fuzzy labeling. An iteration in αt is carried out by
computing a new labeling αt+1 for all arguments A as follows:
αt+1(A) =
1
2αt(A) +
1
2 min{A(A), 1− maxB:(B,A)∈Dαt(B)}. (10)
Note that Equation 10 guarantees that αt(A) ≤ A(A) for all arguments A and
for each step of the algorithm.
The above definition actually defines a sequence {αt}t=0,1,... of labelings, whose
convergence has been proven [18]. We may now define the fuzzy labeling of a fuzzy
argumentation framework as the limit of {αt}t=0,1,....
Definition 27. Let 〈A,D〉 be a fuzzy argumentation framework. A fuzzy reinstate-
ment labeling for such argumentation framework is, for all arguments A,
α(A) = lim
t→∞αt(A). (11)
Once this fuzzy reinstatement labeling has been computed, α(A) gives the degree
to which each argument A in the framework is accepted; this degree may be used to
compute the corresponding degree to which the purpose of a norm is G:
α(G) = max
A:Conc(A)=G
α(A). (12)
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As it is clear from the above definitions, an argument may be accepted partially and
thus the purpose of a norm may be uncertain. Now, different strategies may be used
to deal with such an uncertainty. One possibility is to consider the purpose G for
which α(G) is maximal. Another is to evaluate the norm with respect to all purposes
such that α(G) > 0 and then combine the results weighted by ther corresponding
α(G).
6 Interpreting a Norm with Flexibility
In addition to taking graded categories into account, any norm is always associ-
ated with a purpose: that is what is called the purpose of the norm. The idea is
then to capture the fact that, when a legislator states a norm, she has in mind a
state of affairs to be reached through compliance with that norm. With that in
mind, the degree to which a concept in the rule belongs to a category would also
depend on the purpose associated with the rule. In other words, given a norm like
b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l, the degree associated to l depends on the degrees of truth of condi-
tions bi. These degrees depend in turn on the purpose associated to the norm: for
example, the greater the extent to which the prohibition to smoke in public spaces
promotes the goal public health, the greater is the degree of applicability of a rule like
Public_Space⇒ No_Smoking assuming the fuzziness of the concept Public_Space.
However, the actual purpose of the legislator can be controversial [36]: for exam-
ple, not enough evidence or factual information might be available which could help
discover what the legislator was intending when writing a norm. Note that the his-
torical purpose could be obsolete due to social, economic or political change, and
the legislator has not reacted in a timely manner or at all. Here, as done in legal
theory [43, 50], we adopt an objective teleological approach to interpretation, which
means that the purpose of a norm is the one that any rational interpreter would
assign to it. Hence, we use an argumentative system which will determine which
purpose, with respect to the current knowledge, is the most plausible purpose of a
norm.
The case study in our chapter is the application of the Italian Legislative Act
n. 40/2004 on “Medically Assisted Reproduction.” Before the declaration of uncos-
titutionality ruled by the Constitutional Court (opinion n. 96/2015), the statute
included section 4, par. 1: “The recourse to medically assisted reproduction tech-
niques is allowed only [. . . ] in the cases of sterility or infertility [. . . ].” The purpose of
the discussion is to see whether this provision can be interpreted so that non-sterile
or fertile couples, in which one or both spouses are immune carriers of a serious
genetic anomaly, could access those techniques.
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These couples are able to conceive and bear a child, though the probability that
the baby will contract the disease is high. These diseases are normally severely
disabling, provoke physical dysfunctions, often prevent the full psychological de-
velopment of the baby, and can cause premature death. The mentioned medical
techniques can detect the illness in advance and consequently let the parents take
aware decisions about the pregnancy.
The legislative act does not explicitly define ‘sterility’ and ‘infertility.’ On the
basis of art. 7 l. 40/2004, every three years, the Ministry of Health is required
to promulgate a decree containing the updated guidelines for the application of the
law. According to these guidelines, the terms ‘sterility’ and ‘infertility’ are considered
synonyms and refer to the lack of conception, in addition to those cases of certified
pathology, after 12/24 months of regular sexual relations in a heterosexual couple.
In civil law systems, when it comes to statutory interpretation, one option is
teleological interpretation, according to which, when interpreting a provision, judges
often take into account what explicit or implicit purposes can be ascribed to the norm
[43, 36].
As for the purposes, law n. 40/2004 states as follows:
Art. 1, on “Purposes”. Par.1: In order to favour the solution of reproduction
problems caused by human sterility or infertility, it is allowed the recourse to
medically assisted reproduction techniques, according to the conditions and
the modalities provided for by the present law, which guarantees the respect
of the rights of all the subjects involved, included the conceived baby.
Let us also consider the following norm from art. 4 of L. n. 40/2004:
The use of techniques of medically assisted procreation is [. . . ] confined
to the cases with issue of infertility or [. . . ] sterility certified by a medical
procedure.
Law n. 40/2004 is connected to other statutes of the legal system. In particular,
the Italian Legislative Act n.194/1978 on “Social Protection of Maternity and Abor-
tion" provides for the possibility of a therapeutic abortion if, during pregnancy, a
pathological condition is ascertained, including those relating to significant anoma-
lies or malformations of the baby, that put at risk the physical or psychic health
of the woman." Severe genetic diseases are thus included. Moreover, along law n.
194/1978, the chance of a serious danger for the life of the woman is seen as a reason
to proceed to abortion. This second legislative act is thus meant to promote the
right to health both of the mother and of the child.
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In light of the previous remarks, we can outline a list of interpretive arguments
supporting different interpretations. Our main target is to see what interpretation
better promotes the purposes that can be ascribed to the norm, if a purpose can be
considered prominent, and what attacks can occur.
In what follows we present a plausible set of rules representing norms and inter-
pretive legal arguments about such norms [49]. In both cases, fuzzy argumentation
is related to the promotion of legal purposes.
In particular, the following (defeasible) rules can identify the basic the interpre-
tive arguments arg1, arg2, arg3, respectively, at stake:
r1 : ¬Ste(x),Rsn_Exp_Life(x)⇒ ¬Med_Rpr(x)
r2 : Med_Rpr(x),Genetic_Dis(x),Well_Being(x)⇒
Sol_Rep_Prob(x)
r3 : ¬Sol_Rep_Prob(x),Genetic_Dis(x)⇒
¬Rsn_Exp_Life(x)
r4 : Gener_Child(x)⇒ ¬Ste(x)
where
• Ste(x) = “x is sterile”,
• Med_Rpr(x) = “x can access to medically assisted reproduction techniques”,
• Rsn_Exp_Life(x) =“x grants a reasonably expected life”,
• Genetic_Dis(x) =“x is affected by a serious genetic disease”,
• Well_Being(x) =“x enjoys psychological well-being”,
• Sol_Rep_Prob(x) =“legally solved for x the reproduction problems”,
• Gener_Child(x) = “x can generate children”.
Consider the case mentioned above: a couple is actually able to conceive and
generate children (Gener_Child(CP)), but they are both carriers of a serious genetic
disease (Genetic_Dis(CP)), which does not allow children to live for more than a
few years. Then according to the above rules, we have the following arguments:
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arg1 = ¬Sol_Rep_Prob(CP),Genetic_Dis(CP)⇒
¬Rsn_Exp_Life(CP)
arg2 = Gener_Child(CP)⇒ ¬Ste(CP)⇒
Rsn_Exp_Life(CP),¬Ste(CP)⇒ ¬Med_Rpr(CP)
arg3 = Med_Rpr(CP),Genetic_Dis(CP),
Well_Being(CP)⇒ Sol_Rep_Prob(CP).
The attack relation between arguments are: arg1 attacks arg2, arg2 attacks arg3,
and arg3 attacks arg1. Then, we have the following argumentation framework:
arg1 // arg2 // arg3jj
Figure 2: An argumentation framework
Let us consider these purposes:
• Hlth_Of_MnC =“purpose: the right to health both of the mother and the
child”; this purpose is associated to rule r2, i.e., we assume that r2 promotes
purpose Hlth_Of_MnC;
• No_Eugenic =“purpose: no eugenic selection”; this purpose is associated to
rules r1 and r4, i.e., we assume that r1 and r4 promote purpose No_Eugenic.
For the sake of illustration, let us also assume that only two concepts are fuzzy:
Gener_Child and Well_Being. Hence, if we consider, for example, r4, this means
that fuzziness depends only on the fact that rule r4 makes the degree of ¬Ste(CP)
as dependent on the degree of capability of generating children by CP. No other
source of vagueness are considered for r4. Analogous considerations apply to rule r2
in regard to Well_Being.
Given these purposes, we can measure the degrees to which the premise of rules
r2 and r4 are satisfied by CP.
• Rule r4: Let us assume that only one prototype p1 is associated to
Gener_Child and No_Eugenic (for example, a standard fertile couple sta-
tistically identified in the population of couples) in which, among others, the
expected life of children is greater than 50 years and the incidence of genetic
diseases is less than 20%. Clearly, these are distinctive features that differen-
tiates p1 with respect to CP: suppose that the overall distinctive features are
d1, . . . , d6, while the common features are c1, . . . , c4.
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If we apply Definition 15, then s(CP, p1) = 44+6 =
4
10 = 0.4. Since p is the
unique prototype for Gener_Child with respect to No_Eugenic and that G
for r4 is {No_Eugenic}, then it is easy to check that (see, in particular,
Definitions 16 and 19)
µ ˜Gener_Child(CP) = Deg(r4 | G) = K(Gener_Child(CP)) = 0.4.
• Rule r2: Let us assume that only one prototype p2 is associated toWell_Being
and Hlth_Of_MnC and that the overall distinctive features are d′1, . . . , d′16,
while the common features are c′1, . . . , c′4. For the same reason, given that
A(r2) stands for Med_Rpr(CP) ∧Genetic_Dis(CP) ∧Well_Being(CP),
s(CP, p2) = µ ˜Well_Being(CP) = Deg(r2 | G′) = K(A(r2)) = 0.2.
Given these degrees of activation of rules, the following table illustrates how
to apply the machinery of fuzzy labeling to this scenario, given the above degrees
of activation of the rules that determine the strength of arguments. As we noted,
we defined the fuzzy labeling of a fuzzy argumentation framework as the limit of
{αt}t=0,1,.... The convergence is obtained quickly: a small number of iterations is
enough to get close to the limit.
t αt(arg1) αt(arg2) αt(arg3)
0 1 0.4 0.2
1 0.9 0.2 0.2
2 0.85 0.15 0.2
3 0.825 0.15 0.2
4 0.8125 0.1625 0.2
5 0.8 0.175 ↓
6 ↓ 0.2
Table 1: Fuzzy labeling
Therefore, arg1 is accepted to degree 0.8 while arg2 and arg3 are given a much
lower acceptance degree, namely 0.2. In other words, arg1 is much more acceptable
than arg2 and arg3. Its important to observe that these degrees just represent an
order of plausibility, as if saying that arg1 is four times as plausible as arg2 or arg3.
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7 Related work
Young et al. [64] endowed Brewka’s prioritized default logic (PDL) with argumen-
tation semantics using the ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation [41].
More precisely, their goal is to define a preference ordering over arguments %, based
on the strict total order over defeasible rules defined to instantiate ASPIC+ to
PDL, so as to ensure that an extension within PDL corresponds to the justified
conclusions of its ASPIC+ instantiation. Several options are investigated, and they
demonstrate that the standard ASPIC+ elitist ordering cannot be used to calcu-
late % as there is no correspondence between the argumentation-defined inferences
and PDL, and the same holds for a disjoint elitist preference ordering. The authors
come up with a new argument preference ordering definition which captures both
preferences over arguments and also when defeasible rules become applicable in the
arguments’ construction, leading to the definition of a strict total order on defea-
sible rules and corresponding non-strict arguments. Their representation theorem
shows that a correspondence always exists between the inferences made in PDL and
the conclusions of justified arguments in the ASPIC+ instantiation under stable
semantics.
Brewka and Eiter [15] consider programs supplied with priority information,
which is given by a supplementary strict partial ordering of the rules. This addi-
tional information is used to solve potential conflicts. Moreover, their idea is that
conclusions should be only those literals that are contained in at least one answer
set. They propose to use preferences on rules for selecting a subset of the answer
sets, called the preferred answer sets. In their approach, a rule is applied unless it
is defeated via its assumptions by rules of higher priorities.
Dung [21] presents an approach to deal with contradictory conclusions in defeasi-
ble reasoning with priorities. More precisely, he starts from the observation that of-
ten, the proposed approaches to defeasible reasoning with priorities (e.g., [14, 51, 40])
sanction contradictory conclusions, as exemplified by ASPIC+ using the weakest link
principle together with the elitist ordering which returns contradictory conclusions
with respect to its other three attack relations, and the conclusions reached with the
well known approach of Brewka and Eiter [15]. Dung shows then that the semantics
for any complex interpretation of default preferences can be characterized by a sub-
set of the set of stable extensions with respect to the normal attack relation assign-
ments, i.e., a normal form for ordinary attack relation assignments. Dung’s normal
attack relation satisfies some desirable properties (Credulous cumulativity and At-
tack monotonicity) that cannot be satisfied by the ASPIC+ semantics [21], i.e., the
semantics of structured argumentation with respect to a given ordering of structured
arguments (elitist or democratic pre-order) in ASPIC+. In the setting of this paper,
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this notion could be defined as follows. Let α = (a1, . . . , an) and β = (b1, . . . , bm)
be arguments constructed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. Since we
have no Pollock style undercutting argument (as in ASPIC+) and each norm is as-
sumed to be defeasible, α is said to normally attack argument β if and only if β has a
sub-argument β′ such that concl(α) = concl(β′), and r((an−1, an)) ≥ r((bm−1, bm)).
According to the weakest link principle and Definition 23, the normal defeat relation
is equivalent to the defeat relation using the last link principle in this paper.
Kakas et al. [32] present a logic of arguments called argumentation logic, where
the foundations of classical logical reasoning are represented from an argumentation
perspective. More precisely, their goal is to integrate into the single argumentative
representation framework both classical reasoning, as in propositional logic, and
defeasible reasoning.
You et al. [63] define a prioritized argumentative characterization of non-
monotonic reasoning, by casting default reasoning as a form of prioritized argu-
mentation. They illustrate how the parameterized formulation of priority may be
used to allow various extensions and modifications to default reasoning.
We, and all these approaches, share the idea that an argumentative characteriza-
tion of NMR formalisms, like prioritized default logic in Young’s case and hierarchi-
cal abstract normative systems in our approach, contributes to make the inference
process more transparent to humans. However, the targeted NMR formalism is
different, leading to different challenges in the representation results. To the best
of our knowledge, no other approach addressed the challenge of an argumentative
characterization of prioritized normative reasoning.
Prakken and Sartor [48] proposed to define a dynamic argumentation sys-
tem as a tuple S = 〈L,−,R, n〉 where L is a logical language including sym-
bols for predicates, functions, constants and variables, = for equality, ¬ for nega-
tion and  for normative conditionals, and the universal quantifier ∀, R is the
set of inference rules, and n is the naming convention. A norm has the form
∀(L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ln  L), where L1, . . . , Ln are literals. In particular, they define
inference schemes for validity (V alid(N(φ))→ φ), and applicability (i.e., undercut-
ting, ¬Applicable(w) → ¬DMP (w)). As future direction, the authors foster the
extension of the framework by enriching the logical language with a formal account
of modalities such as obligation. This is the issue we addressed in this chapter.
Van der Torre and Villata [59] extend their dynamic legal argumentation frame-
work with deontic modalities, and they propose an general framework for legal rea-
soning based on ASPIC-like argumentation and input/output logic. The framework
allows to reason over normative concepts like factual and deontic detachment, and
to assess norms’ equivalence. The properties of our logical framework are proved.
All new concepts are illustrated by a running example. Our main technical contri-
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bution is to give a formal analysis of legal argumentation, and a bridge to standard
formalisms for normative systems like input/output logic. Compared to other in-
put/output logics, van der Torre and Villata do not have weakening of the output or
aggregation of obligations due to the clausal language. For a comparison with other
deontic logics in the recent handbook on deontic logic and normative systems we
can define the inference relation in terms of consequence sets as usual (e.g., KB |= φ
iff φ ∈ Out(KB)).
A framework for legal interpretation capable of taking graded, purpose-
dependent institutional facts into account has been proposed by da Costa Periera et
al. [17]. Such a framework uses argumentation to handle conflicts between different
interpretations of legal concepts. The originality of this proposal lies in the use
of argumentation to identify the most likely purpose of a norm, which in turn cir-
cumscribes the interpretation of the categories (institutional facts, legal concepts)
referred to by the norm. The idea of using many-valued logics in argumentation
theory is not new. Just to name a few, [16] define a notion of gradual accept-
ability such that a numerical value is assigned to each argument on the basis of
its attackers; Janssen et al. [31] propose a fuzzy approach enriching the expressive
power of classical argumentation, whose originality lies in the fact that the frame-
work allows to represent the relative strength of the attacks; Grossi and Modgil [26]
propose a graded generalization of argumentation semantics in which the origin
of the justification degrees is supposed to be exclusively endogenous, i.e., based
exclusively on the topology of the attack relation. Qualitative approaches to argu-
ments’ acceptability have been proposed in preference-based argumentation frame-
works (PAF) [3], value-based argumentation frameworks (VAF) [9], and weighted
argumentation frameworks (WAF) [22]. These approaches do not define graded
semantics: (i) PAFs take into account preference orderings in the selection of ac-
ceptable conflicting arguments; (ii) VAFs are based on the assumption that some
arguments can be stronger than others with respect to a certain value they advance,
and this affects the success of an attack; and (iii) in WAFs, the weights are used
for deciding which attacks can be ignored when computing the extensions. In these
approaches, however, preference, values, and weights are provided only as input
for the computation of extensions; they do not return an acceptability degree for
arguments as output. Finally, Gabbay [23] proposes an equational approach which
returns multiple (graded) solutions, and thus several rankings for one argumentation
framework.
Other frameworks for legal argumentation are listed below, but all of them con-
centrate on specific problems of reasoning with legal arguments, whilst the aim of
our framework, as well as of Prakken and Sartor, is to integrate various aspects so
far addressed separately towards a logic comprehensive model of dynamic legal ar-
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gumentation. The combination of inferences establishing the validity of norms with
inferences using valid norms has been proposed by Yoshino [62]. The view that valid
norms are defeasible reasons for legal conclusions was at the core of reason based
logic by Hage [27]. Arguments about applicability and inapplicability of norms are
discussed by Gordon, Prakken and colleagues [24, 47]. Modeling reasoning with
norms through argumentation schemes has been formalized by Verheij [61]. Further
connections between norms and argumentation include, among others, case based
reasoning [6], arguing in rule based systems [45, 47], dialogues and dialectics [24],
argument schemes [25, 11].
Several works in the literature of AI & Law have considered the role of purposes
in the legal interpretation. Indeed, this idea is standard in legal theory and the
purpose of legal rules is recognised by jurists as decisive in clarifying the scope of the
legal concepts that qualify the applicability conditions for those rules [8, 46, 55, 27].
[8, 46] use purposes/goals and values in frameworks of case based reasoning for
modeling precedents mainly in a common law context. [55] analyse a number of
legal arguments even in statutory law, which include cases close to the ones discussed
here. Hage [27] addresses, among others, the problem of reconstructing extensive and
restrictive interpretation. This is done in Reason-Based Logic, a logical formalism
that can deal with rules and reasons: the idea is that the satisfaction of rules’
applicability conditions is usually a reason for application of these rules, but there
can also be other (and possibly competing) reasons, among which we have the goals
that led the legislator to make the rules. More recently, various work [12, 13, 66]
proposed formal models for teleological interpretation in statutory law. All these
approaches in AI & Law highlight the importance of rule purposes/goals. However,
it seems that no work so far has attempted to couple this view with fuzzy logic and
argumentation. In this perspective, we believe that this chapter may contribute to
fill a gap in the literature.
8 Conclusions
In this article, we discuss three examples from the literature of handling norms by
means of formal argumentation. First, we discuss how the so-called Greedy and Re-
duction approaches can be represented using the weakest and the last link principles
respectively [35]. Based on such representation results, formal argumentation can
be used to explain the detachment of obligations and permissions from hierarchical
normative systems in a new way. Second, we discuss a dynamic ASPIC-based legal
argumentation theory [48], and we discuss how existing logics of normative systems
can be used to analyse such new argumentation systems [59]. Third, we show how
3068
Handling Norms in MAS by Means of Formal Argumentation
argumentation can be used to reason about other challenges in normative systems
as well, by discussing a model for arguing about legal interpretation [17]. In par-
ticular, we show how fuzzy logic combined with formal argumentation can be used
to reason about the adoption of graded categories and thus address the problem of
open texture in normative interpretation. We refer to the original papers for further
details.
Our aim to discuss these three examples is to inspire new applications of formal
argumentation to the challenges of normative reasoning in multiagent systems. We
do not assume that the possible interactions between normative reasoning and formal
argumentation is restricted to the three examples we discuss in this article. Besides
resolving conflicting norms, norm compliance, norm dynamics and norm interpreta-
tion, it has been used also to argue about enforced obligations and permissions, and
to establish norms’ validity by deriving their conclusions. Moreover, other central
challenge in normative multi-agent system are discussed in the article of Pigozzi and
van der Torre, and we believe that formal argumentation is also applicable to various
other challenges. For example, agents can argue about the creation or emerging of
norms from the mental states of individual agents, or how normative systems can
be merged.
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